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Abstract
Consider a linear time-invariant (LTI) dynamical system monitored by a network of sensors, modeled as nodes of an underlying
directed communication graph. We study the problem of collaboratively estimating the state of the system when certain nodes
are compromised by adversaries. Specifically, we consider a Byzantine adversary model, where a compromised node possesses
complete knowledge of the system dynamics and the network, and can deviate arbitrarily from the rules of any prescribed
algorithm. We first characterize certain fundamental limitations of any distributed state estimation algorithm in terms of the
measurement and communication structure of the nodes. We then develop an attack-resilient, provably correct state estimation
algorithm that admits a fully distributed implementation. To characterize feasible network topologies that guarantee success
of our proposed technique, we introduce a notion of ‘strong-robustness’ that captures both measurement and communication
redundancy. Finally, by drawing connections to bootstrap percolation theory, we argue that given an LTI system and an
associated sensor network, the ‘strong-robustness’ property can be checked in polynomial time.
Key words: Resilient state estimation; distributed estimation; Byzantine attacks.
1 Introduction
The control of large-scale complex networked systems
such as power grids, transportation networks, and multi-
agent robotic systems requires precise estimation of the
state of the underlying dynamical process. Typically, in
these applications, sensors (nodes) collecting informa-
tion about the process are scattered over a geographical
region. As the diameters of such networks increase, rout-
ing information from all the sensors to a central compu-
tational resource induces large delays and creates com-
munication bottlenecks. To bypass these difficulties, it
thus becomes important to consider distributed algo-
rithms where individual sensors communicate only with
sensors within a given distance. However, the potential
merits [1] of such a distributed approach are matched
by various challenges. In particular, a key challenge is to
design networks and distributed algorithms that guaran-
tee reliable operation of the system in the face of faults
or sophisticated adversarial attacks on certain sensors.
This leads to the motivation behind our present work.
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In a classical distributed state estimation setup, each
node receives partial measurements of the state of an LTI
process, and seeks to asymptotically estimate the entire
state by exchanging information with its neighbors in
the network. Given that our primary focus will be on se-
curity related issues associated with this problem, we di-
rect the interested reader to recent work on single-time-
scale distributed observers in [2–9]. For literature on dis-
tributed Kalman filtering, see [10–15]. However, none of
these papers address the challenges associated with tol-
erating unreliable components in the network. Accord-
ingly, we now provide a survey of the cyber-security lit-
erature that is most relevant to our present cause.
Related Work: Over the last decade, a significant
amount of research has focused on security in networked
control systems. In particular, for noiseless dynamical
systems, it has been established that zero-dynamics
play a key role in characterizing the stealth of an at-
tack [16, 17]. For networked control systems affected
by noise, the authors in [18] recently introduced an
information-theoretic metric that quantifies the de-
tectability of an attack. A unifying feature of [16, 18],
and the ones in [19–22], is that they involve systems
where all the sensor measurements are available at a
single location. In the sequel, we shall refer to such sys-
tems as centralized control systems. Our problem for-
mulation and subsequent analysis differs from the above
literature by constraining each sensor to exchange in-
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formation with only its neighbors in the communication
graph. Some recent related work on resilient distributed
parameter estimation and resilient decentralized hy-
pothesis testing are reported in [23] and [24], respec-
tively. The authors in [25] consider the problem of joint
attack detection and state estimation. However, the
attack model, the system model, and the assumptions
on the communication graph in [25] differ considerably
from the ones considered in this paper.
While the study of security in centralized control sys-
tems is now mature, there lacks a comprehensive the-
oretical understanding of analogous questions in a dis-
tributed setting. Preliminary attempts to counter adver-
sarial behavior in a distributed state estimation context
are reported in [26], [27]. However, unlike our results,
these papers neither provide any theoretical guarantees
of success, nor allude to graph-theoretic conditions that
are necessary for their respective algorithms to work.
Recently, in [28], the authors employ an H∞ based ap-
proach for detecting biasing attacks in distributed esti-
mation networks. Our present work deviates from [28]
in several aspects, namely (i) while the analysis in [28]
is limited to a certain class of attack inputs, our attack
model allows compromised nodes to behave arbitrarily,
i.e., no restrictions are placed on the inputs that can be
injected by an adversary, (ii) unlike [28], we develop a fil-
tering algorithm that allows each uncompromised node
to asymptotically recover the state of the plant without
explicitly detecting the nodes under attack, and (iii) the
existence of the attack detection filter proposed in [28]
relies on solving an LMI; however, the authors neither
provide graph-theoretic insights regarding the solvabil-
ity of such an LMI nor discuss whether the LMI can
be solved in a distributed manner. In contrast, we de-
tail graph-theoretic conditions that allow each step of
our approach to have a resilient, distributed implemen-
tation. Summing up, this paper attempts to bridge the
gap between centralized and distributed resilient state
estimation. Our main contributions are discussed below.
Contributions: Our contributions are threefold. First,
in Section 3, we characterize certain necessary condi-
tions that need to be satisfied by the sensor measure-
ments and the communication graph for the distributed
state estimation problem to be solvable in the presence
of arbitrary adversarial behavior. Our results hold for
any algorithm and hence identify fundamental limita-
tions that are of both theoretical and practical impor-
tance in the design of attack-resilient robust networks.
We also argue that our impossibility results in the dis-
tributed setting generalize those existing for centralized
control systems subject to sensor attacks [29,30].
For the problem under consideration, it is imperative to
understand which (potentially adversarial) neighbors a
given node should listen to, and subsequently, how it
should process the information received from neighbors
it chooses to listen to. Consequently, our second contri-
bution is to develop a distributed filtering algorithm in
Section 4 that enables each uncompromised node to re-
cover the entire state dynamics, provided certain graph
conditions are met. A thorough analysis of the proposed
filtering scheme is then presented in Section 5.
As our third contribution, in Section 7, we introduce a
topological property called ‘strong-robustness’ to char-
acterize feasible systems and networks that guarantee
applicability of our approach. By drawing connections to
bootstrap percolation theory, we show that the ‘strong-
robustness’ property can be checked in polynomial time
(in the size of the system and the network).
Comparison with prior work by the authors: We
reported certain preliminary results in [31]. In this pa-
per, we significantly expand upon our prior work in the
following ways. (i) While the analysis in [31] was lim-
ited to system matrices with real, distinct eigenvalues,
our present framework allows the system matrix to have
arbitrary spectrum. This generalization (accounting for
complex, possibly repeated eigenvalues) requires various
appropriate modifications to the algorithm developed
in [31], along with a more detailed technical analysis. (ii)
Section 3 is a new addition entirely, and discusses funda-
mental limitations of any distributed state estimation al-
gorithm in the face of arbitrary adversarial attacks. (iii)
Section 7 contains additional details about properties
of feasible network topologies, and establishes the key
result that the topological condition (namely ‘strong-
robustness’) needed for implementing our proposed al-
gorithm can be checked in polynomial time. The latter
result (missing in [31]) is particularly important since it
highlights the applicability of our overall approach.
Notation: A directed graph is denoted by G = (V, E),
where V = {1, · · · , N} is the set of nodes and E ⊆ V ×V
represents the edges. An edge from node j to node i, de-
noted by (j, i), implies that node j can transmit infor-
mation to node i. The neighborhood of the i-th node is
defined as Ni , {j | (j, i) ∈ E}. A node j is said to be an
out-neighbor of node i if (i, j) ∈ E . By an induced sub-
graph of G obtained by removing certain nodes C ⊂ V,
we refer to the subgraph that has V\C as its node set and
contains only those edges of E with both end points in
V \ C. The notation |V| is used to denote the cardinality
of a set V. The set of all eigenvalues (or modes) of a ma-
trix A is denoted by sp(A) = {λ ∈ C | det(A−λI) = 0},
and the set of all unstable eigenvalues by ΛU (A) = {λ ∈
sp(A) | |λ| ≥ 1}. We use aA(λ) and gA(λ) to denote
the algebraic and geometric multiplicities, respectively,
of an eigenvalue λ ∈ sp(A). An eigenvalue λ is said to
be simple if aA(λ) = gA(λ) = 1. Given a set of ma-
trices {A1, · · · ,An}, we use diag(A1, · · · ,An) to refer
to a block diagonal matrix with Ai as its i-th block
entry. For a set J = {m1, · · · ,m|J |} ⊆ {1, · · · , N},
and a matrix C =
[
CT1 · · · CTN
]T
, we define CJ ,
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[
CTm1 · · · CTm|J |
]T
. The identity matrix of dimension
r is denoted Ir, and N+ is used to refer to the set of
all positive integers. The terms ‘communication graph’
and ‘network’ are used interchangeably, and the term
‘resilient’ is used in the same context as that used tradi-
tionally in the computer science literature to deal with
worst-case adversarial attack models [32].
2 System and Attack Model
System Model: Consider the LTI dynamical system
x[k + 1] = Ax[k], (1)
where k ∈ N is the discrete-time index, x[k] ∈ Rn is the
state vector and A ∈ Rn×n is the system matrix. The
system is monitored by a network G = (V, E) consisting
ofN nodes. The i-th node receives a measurement of the
state, given by
yi[k] = Cix[k], (2)
where yi[k] ∈ Rri and Ci ∈ Rri×n. We use C =[
CT1 · · · CTN
]T
to represent the collection of the
individual node observation matrices; accordingly,
y[k] =
[
yT1 [k] · · · yTN [k]
]T
represents the collective
measurement vector, i.e., y[k] = Cx[k].
Each node is tasked with estimating the entire system
state x[k] based on information received from its neigh-
bors and its local measurements (if any). As such, we
assume that the pair (A,C) is detectable (this is a nec-
essary condition for solving the distributed state estima-
tion problem even in the absence of adversaries); how-
ever, we do not assume that the pair (A,Ci) is detectable
for any i ∈ V. Two immediate challenges are as follows:
(i) As the pair (A,Ci) may not be detectable for some
(or all) i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, information exchange is neces-
sary; and (ii) information exchange is restricted by the
underlying communication graph G. In addition to the
above challenges, in this paper, we allow for the possibil-
ity that certain nodes in the network are compromised
by an adversary, and do not follow their prescribed state
estimate update rule. We will use the following adver-
sary model in this paper.
Adversary Model: We consider a subset A ⊂ V of the
nodes in the network to be adversarial. We assume that
the adversarial nodes are completely aware of the net-
work topology, the system dynamics and the algorithm
employed by the non-adversarial nodes. Such an assump-
tion of omniscient adversarial behavior is standard in the
literature on resilient distributed algorithms [33–38], and
allows us to provide guarantees against “worst-case” ad-
versarial behavior. In terms of capabilities, an adversar-
ial node can leverage the aforementioned information to
arbitrarily deviate from the rules of any prescribed algo-
rithm, while colluding with other adversaries in the pro-
cess. Furthermore, following the Byzantine fault model
[32], adversaries are allowed to send differing state esti-
mates to different neighbors at the same instant of time.
To characterize the threat model in terms of the number
of adversaries in the network, we will use the following
definitions from [37], [38].
Definition 1 (f-total set) A set C ⊂ V is f -total if it
contains at most f nodes in the network, i.e., |C| ≤ f .
Definition 2 (f-local set) A set C ⊂ V is f -local if it
contains at most f nodes in the neighborhood of the other
nodes, i.e., |Ni ∩ C| ≤ f, ∀i ∈ V \ C.
Definition 3 (f-local and f-total adversarial mod-
els) A set A of adversarial nodes is f -locally bounded
(resp., f -totally bounded) if A is an f -local (resp., f -
total) set.
In the literature dealing with distributed fault-tolerant
algorithms, it is a common assumption to consider an
f -total adversarial model. However, to allow for a large
number of adversaries in large scale networks, we will al-
low the adversarial set to be f -local. Summarily, the ad-
versary model considered throughout this paper will be
referred to as an f -locally bounded Byzantine adversary
model. The non-adversarial nodes will be referred to as
regular nodes and be represented by the set R = V \A.
Note that the actual number and identities of the ad-
versarial nodes are not known to the regular nodes. As
is standard, any reliable system is designed to provide a
desired level of resilience against a maximum number of
component failures or attacks. We share the same phi-
losophy. Specifically, we assume that each node in the
network is programmed to tolerate upto a maximum of
f adversaries in the entire network (in an f -total model)
or in its own neighborhood (in an f -local model). Such
an assumption is typical in the design of distributed pro-
tocols (for varied applications, such as consensus [33,34],
optimization [35,36], and broadcasting [37,38]) that are
resilient to worst-case Byzantine attack models like the
one considered in this paper.
Throughout this paper, we shall only consider causal
(i.e., nodes act only on past and present information),
synchronous (i.e., all nodes share a common clock w.r.t.
their iterates), and deterministic algorithms (i.e., given
the same input, such algorithms generate the same out-
put); note however that the notions of causal and deter-
ministic behavior apply only to the regular nodes. We
shall also assume that all quantities being updated iter-
atively by the regular nodes are initialized identically in
each execution. With xˆi[k] representing the estimate of
x[k] maintained by node i, the problem studied in this
paper can be formally stated as follows.
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Fig. 1. A 2-dimensional LTI system with two distinct, real,
unstable eigenvalues (modes) λ1, λ2 is monitored by a net-
work G of 10 nodes as shown above. Nodes 1-3 can detect
λ1, while nodes 8-10 can detect λ2. Thus, the two minimal
critical sets associated with the above system and network
are F1 = {1, 2, 3} and F2 = {8, 9, 10}. An example of a set
that is critical, but not minimal, is {1, 2, 3, 8}. The virtual
source nodes associated with F1 and F2 are s1 and s2, re-
spectively. There are no 1-total pair cuts w.r.t. s1 or s2. The
set H = {4, 5, 6, 7} is a 1-local pair cut w.r.t. both s1 and s2
since H can be partitioned into H1 = {4, 5} and H2 = {6, 7},
each of which are 1-local sets. Since H1 and H2 are each
2-total sets, H is also a 2-total pair cut w.r.t. both s1 and s2.
Problem 1 (Resilient Distributed State Estima-
tion) Given an LTI system (1), a linear measurement
model (2), and a time-invariant directed communication
graph G, design a set of state estimate update and infor-
mation exchange rules such that limk→∞ ||xˆi[k]−x[k]|| =
0, ∀i ∈ R, regardless of the actions of any f -locally
bounded set of Byzantine adversaries.
The interplay between the measurement structure of the
nodes and the underlying communication graph results
in certain conditions being necessary for solving Problem
1, irrespective of the choice of algorithms. We provide
such conditions in the following section.
3 Fundamental Limitations of any Distributed
State Estimation Algorithm
Intuitively, the network must possess a certain degree of
measurement redundancy as well as redundancy in its
communication structure so as to counteract the effects
of adversarial behavior. More specifically, the measure-
ments of the regular nodes must ensure collective de-
tectability of the state, and the network structure should
prevent the malicious nodes from acting as bottlenecks
between correctly functioning nodes. To identify neces-
sary conditions for resilient distributed state estimation
that capture the above notions of redundancy, we first
introduce some terminology.
Definition 4 (Critical Set) A set of nodes F ⊂ V is
said to be a critical set if the pair (A,CV\F ) is not de-
tectable.
Note that detectability of (A,C) implies that a critical
set must necessarily be non-empty.
Definition 5 (Minimal Critical Set) A set F ⊂ V is
said to be a minimal critical set if F is a critical set and
no subset of F is a critical set.
Let M = {F1, · · · ,F|M|} denote the set of all minimal
critical sets. With each set Fi ∈ M, we associate a vir-
tual node si as follows. Directed edges are added from si
to each node in Fi and the resulting network is denoted
by G′i = (V ∪ si, E ∪ Ei), where Ei represents the set of
edges from si to Fi.
Definition 6 (f -local pair and f-total pair cuts
w.r.t. si) Consider a minimal critical set Fi ∈ M. A
set H ⊂ V is called a cut w.r.t. si if removal of H from
G′i results in an induced subgraph of G
′
i whose node set
can be partitioned into two non-empty sets X and Y with
si ∈ X , and no directed paths from X to Y in the induced
subgraph. A cut H w.r.t. si is called an f -local pair cut
(resp., f -total pair cut) w.r.t. si if it can be partitioned
as H = H1 ∪ H2 such that both H1 and H2 are f -local
(resp., f -total) in G.
For an illustration of the above definitions, see Figure 1.
The following result identifies a fundamental limitation
for f -local adversarial models.
Theorem 1 Suppose there exists an f -local pair cut
w.r.t. si in G′i for some minimal critical set Fi ∈ M.
Then, it is impossible for any causal, synchronous and
deterministic algorithm to solve Problem 1.
Proof. Suppose there exists an f -local pair cutH = H1∪
H2 w.r.t. si for some minimal critical set Fi ∈ M. For
the sake of contradiction, suppose there exists a causal,
synchronous and deterministic algorithm T that solves
Problem 1 for the given network G. From the definition of
H, we see that Y contains no elements of Fi. Since Fi is
a critical set, it then follows that the pair (A,CY) is not
detectable. Thus, there exists an initial condition x[0] =
η that causes the measurement set yY [k] corresponding
to Y to be identically zero for all time, while the state
x[k] remains bounded away from zero. The idea of the
proof will be to demonstrate that the nodes in Y cannot
distinguish between the zero initial condition and the
initial condition η under an appropriately constructed
attack. To this end, noting that each of the sets H1 and
H2 are f -local and can hence act as valid adversarial
sets, we consider the following executions σ and σ′ of T .
Execution σ: The initial condition is x[0] = 0. The
nodes inH1 are regular while the nodes inH2 are adver-
sarial. The nodes inH2 pretend that their state estimates
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are xˆH2 [k] and that their measurements are CH2A
kη,
where xˆH2 [k] represents the collection of the state esti-
mates maintained by the nodes in H2 during the execu-
tion σ′ of T . Additionally, at each time-step, the nodes
in H2 perform the exact same actions that they perform
during the execution σ′.
Execution σ′: The initial condition is x[0] = η. The
nodes in H2 are regular while the nodes in H1 are ad-
versarial. The nodes in H1 pretend that their state esti-
mates are xˆH1 [k] and that their measurements are zero,
where xˆH1 [k] represents the collection of the state esti-
mates maintained by the nodes in H1 during the execu-
tion σ of T . Additionally, at each time-step, the nodes
in H1 perform the exact same actions that they perform
during the execution σ.
Since the actions of the adversaries in the two executions
described above are coupled, it becomes important to
establish that such actions are in fact well-defined. To
do so, we argue as follows. Consider the actions of the
adversarial set H2 at time k = 0 of execution σ. Due
to their omniscient nature, these adversaries can antic-
ipate the information that a regular set H2 is supposed
to transmit at time k = 0 of execution σ′ based on al-
gorithm T . Thus, their actions are well-defined at time
k = 0. Note that the last two statements rely on the de-
terministic nature of T . Specifically, under a determinis-
tic algorithm T , the actions of the regular nodes are also
deterministic, and hence, can be predicted in advance
by an omniscient adversary who is aware of the infor-
mation set available to such regular nodes. An identical
argument defines the actions of the adversarial set H1
at time k = 0 of execution σ′. Since the actions of both
the sets H1 and H2 at time k = 0 are well-defined in
each of the executions σ and σ′, the response of the reg-
ular nodes to such actions (in the respective executions)
at time k = 1 can be anticipated by any adversarial set.
Specifically, to generate their actions at time k = 1 of
execution σ (resp., execution σ′), the adversarial set H2
(resp., H1) simply simulates execution σ′ (resp., execu-
tion σ) for time k = 0 to figure out how a regular set
H2 (resp., H1) would act at time k = 1 of execution σ′
(resp., execution σ). Repeating the above argument re-
veals that the actions of the respective adversarial sets
in each of the executions σ and σ′ are well-defined at
every time step.
Based on the attack described above, it is clear that the
nodes in Y receive the same state estimate and measure-
ment information from the nodes inH in each of the two
executions. Further, their own measurements are iden-
tically zero for all time in each of the two executions.
Hence, based on such identical information, it is impossi-
ble for the nodes in Y to resolve the difference in the un-
derlying initial conditions via algorithm T . This leads to
the desired contradiction and completes the proof.
Remark 1 Interestingly, the necessary condition pre-
sented in the above theorem bears close resemblance to
the necessary condition in [38] for resilient broadcasting
subject to the same f -local Byzantine adversary model
that we consider here. This similarity can be attributed to
the following analogy: viewing the virtual nodes as orig-
inators of messages in a broadcasting context, Problem
1 can be interpreted as a version of the resilient broad-
casting problem where the regular nodes are required to
agree (asymptotically) on a time-varying message that
captures the state evolution of the system.
Our next result provides a necessary condition for an f -
total (and hence, also an f -local) adversarial model.
Theorem 2 Suppose there exists a causal, synchronous
and deterministic algorithm that solves the variant of
Problem 1 corresponding to an f -total Byzantine adver-
sary model. Then, the following equivalent statements
are true.
(i) Consider any minimal critical set Fi ∈ M. There ex-
ists no f -total pair cut w.r.t. si.
(ii) Consider a node i ∈ V such that (A,Ci) is not de-
tectable. LetXi denote the set of all nodes in G that have
directed paths to node i, and consider a set Di ⊆ Xi
such that |Di| ≤ 2f . Let Pi ⊆ Xi represent the set
of nodes that have directed paths to node i in the in-
duced subgraph obtained by removingDi from G. Then,
(A,Ci∪Pi) is detectable.
The proof of necessity mimics the proof of Theorem 1,
while the equivalence between the two conditions stated
in Theorem 2 is established in Appendix A.
Remark 2 In [29,30], the authors showed that for cen-
tralized systems subject to f sensor attacks, a neces-
sary condition for estimating the state asymptotically is
that the system should remain detectable after the re-
moval of any 2f sensors. In our present distributed set-
ting, the maximum information about the state that any
given node i can hope to obtain is from the set {i ∪ Xi},
where Xi is defined as in Theorem 2. Thus, the second
part of Theorem 2 generalizes the necessary conditions
in [29, 30]. In [17, 39], the authors established that the
graph-connectivity metric plays a pivotal role in the anal-
ysis of fault-tolerant and resilient distributed consensus
algorithms for settings where there are no underlying
state dynamics that need to be estimated. The results
stated in Theorems 1 and 2 differ from those in [17, 39]
since they blend both graph-theoretic and system-theoretic
requirements. Finally, it can be easily shown that when
there are no adversaries, i.e., when f = 0, the conditions
identified in Theorem 2 reduce to the necessary and suf-
ficient condition for distributed state estimation, namely
every source component (strong components with no in-
coming edges) of the graph should be detectable [2–6].
We now discuss certain implications of Theorem 2. Given
an LTI system (1), a measurement model specified by
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(2), and a communication graph G, it is of both theoreti-
cal and practical interest to know the maximum number
of adversaries that can be tolerated when one seeks to
solve Problem 1. Leveraging Theorem 2, we can provide
an upper bound on this number, as follows.
Corollary 1 Let k denote the smallest positive integer
such that there exists a k-total pair cut w.r.t. si for some
Fi ∈ M. Then, the total number of adversaries f must
satisfy the inequality f < k for Problem 1 to have a
solution. 1
Corollary 2 The condition |Fi| ≥ (2f + 1) ∀Fi ∈M is
necessary for resilient distributed state estimation subject
to the f -local or f -total adversarial model.
The proof of the above result is straightforward and is
hence omitted here. With the above corollary in hand,
one can gain insights regarding the distribution of cer-
tain specific critical sets in the network. To do so, given
an eigenvalue λj ∈ ΛU (A), let {ρ(j)1 , · · · ,ρ(j)gA(λj)} rep-
resent a basis for the null space of (A − λjIn), and let
φ
(j)
i = span{ρ(j)i }, i ∈ {1, · · · , gA(λj)}. We say that
node i can detect the subspace φ
(j)
i if Ciρ
(j)
i 6= 0. 2 Let
W(j)i ⊆ V denote the set of all nodes that can detect
φ
(j)
i . The next result then readily follows from Corollary
2 and the classical PBH test [41].
Proposition 1 For each λj ∈ ΛU (A), if W(j)i ⊂ V,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ gA(λj), then |W(j)i | ≥ (2f + 1) is a nec-
essary condition for resilient distributed state estimation
subject to the f-local or f-total adversarial model.
For systems with distinct eigenvalues, a direct conse-
quence of the above result is the requirement of at least
(2f + 1) nodes that can detect each unstable eigenvalue
of the system. The preceding analysis builds up to the
distributed estimation strategy adopted in this paper. In
particular, our approach involves identifying the locally
detectable and undetectable eigenvalues associated with
a given node, and subsequently devising separate esti-
mation strategies for the subspaces associated with such
eigenvalues. We formalize this idea in the next section.
Remark 3 Two important directions of future investi-
gation are (i) finding an efficient algorithm (if one ex-
ists) for computing k in Corollary 1 either exactly or ap-
proximately, and (ii) determining whether the conditions
stated in Theorem 1 (resp., Theorem 2) are sufficient for
1 Similar bounds for static power system models subject to
attacks were obtained in [40].
2 Throughout the paper, for the sake of conciseness, we use
the terminology “node i can detect eigenvalue λj” to imply
that rank
[
A−λjIn
Ci
]
= n. Each stable eigenvalue is consid-
ered detectable w.r.t. the measurements of every node.
achieving resilient distributed state estimation subject to
an f -local (resp., f -total) Byzantine adversary model.
Note that the main source of computational complexity
associated with the first point lies in finding all the min-
imal critical sets associated with the given system.
4 Resilient Distributed State Estimation
4.1 Preliminaries
For each eigenvalue λ ∈ sp(A), let V(λ) represent a
block diagonal matrix with the Jordan blocks corre-
sponding to λ (in the standard Jordan canonical rep-
resentation of A) along the main block diagonal. We
begin by recalling certain properties of the real Jordan
canonical form of a square matrix that will be useful
for our subsequent development [42]. We first note that
if λ represents a non-real eigenvalue of A and λ¯ rep-
resents its complex-conjugate, then [42, Lemma 3.1.18]
ensures that λ and λ¯ have the same Jordan structure.
Next, let λ = a + ib where a, b ∈ R, and i = √−1.
Let D(a, b) be defined as D(a, b) ,
[
a b
−b a
]
. Then, the
matrix diag(V(λ),V(λ¯)) is similar to a real block up-
per triangular matrix W(λ) ∈ R2aA(λ)×2aA(λ) which has
aA(λ) 2-by-2 blocks D(a, b) on the main block diagonal
and (aA(λ) − 1) blocks I2 on the block superdiagonal.
Henceforth, for a non-real eigenvalue λ ∈ sp(A), W(λ)
will have the meaning discussed above. Let sp(A) =
{{λ1, λ¯1}, · · · , {λp, λ¯p}, λp+1, · · · , λγ} with the first p
pairs representing the non-real eigenvalues, and λp+1 to
λγ representing the real eigenvalues of A. Then, the real
Jordan canonical form theorem [42, Theorem 3.4.1.5] can
be stated as follows.
Theorem 3 There exists a real similarity transforma-
tion matrix T that transforms the state transition ma-
trix A in (1) to a real block diagonal matrix M given by
M = diag(W(λ1), · · · ,W(λp),V(λp+1), · · · ,V(λγ)).
With T as in the above theorem, and z[k] = T−1x[k],
the dynamics (1) are transformed into the form
z[k + 1] = Mz[k]
yi[k] = C¯iz[k], ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , N} (3)
where M = T−1AT and C¯i = CiT. For a non-real
eigenvalue pair {λj , λ¯j} ∈ sp(A), let z(j)[k] ∈ R2aA(λj)
represent the portion of the state z[k] associated with
the matrix W(λj). Similarly, for a real eigenvalue λj ∈
sp(A), z(j)[k] ∈ RaA(λj) is the portion of the state z[k]
associated with the matrix V(λj). For each node i, we
denote the detectable and undetectable eigenvalues by
the sets Oi and Oi, respectively. Next, we introduce the
notion of source nodes.
6
Definition 7 (Source nodes) For each λj ∈ ΛU (A),
the set of nodes that can detect λj is denoted by Sj, and
called the set of source nodes for λj.
We now proceed to develop an estimation scheme that
enables each regular node to estimate z[k] (from which
they can obtain x[k] = Tz[k]). Accordingly, let zˆ
(j)
i [k]
denote the estimate of z(j)[k] (the portion of z[k] cor-
responding to the eigenvalue λj
3 ) maintained by node
i ∈ R. For each λj ∈ ΛU (A), our estimation scheme re-
lies on separate strategies for nodes in Sj and V \ Sj .
In particular, each node in Sj employs a Luenberger ob-
server for estimating z(j)[k]. The nodes in V \ Sj , on
the other hand, cannot detect the eigenvalue λj , and
thus rely on a resilient consensus algorithm to estimate
z(j)[k]. In what follows, we discuss these ideas in detail.
The first step in the estimation process involves the
above common coordinate transformation given by
z[k] = T−1x[k], to be performed by each regular node
of the graph. As this only requires knowledge of the
system matrix A (which is assumed to be known by all
the nodes), all of the nodes can do this in a distributed
manner (e.g., by using an agreed-upon convention for
ordering the eigenvalues and corresponding eigenvec-
tors). Building on the general theme in [3], we first
present a method that allows a regular node i ∈ R to
estimate the locally detectable portion of the state z[k]
without communicating with neighbors. To this end,
consider the following result.
Lemma 1 Let λj ∈ Oi be a non-real eigenvalue. Let
C¯
(j)
i denote the columns of C¯i corresponding to W(λj)
in (3). Then, the pair (W(λj), C¯
(j)
i ) is detectable.
Proof. We claim that λj ∈ Oi if and only if λ¯j ∈ Oi.
It suffices to prove necessity since the proof for suffi-
ciency will follow an identical argument. We prove ne-
cessity by contradiction. Suppose node i can detect λj
(i.e., λj ∈ Oi), but cannot detect λ¯j . Then, there exists
v 6= 0 such that Av = λ¯jv and Civ = 0. Taking com-
plex conjugates on both sides of these equations reveals
that node i cannot detect λj , leading to the desired con-
tradiction. Given that a similarity transformation maps
(A,Ci) to (M, C¯i), it then follows that {λj , λ¯j} are de-
tectable eigenvalues w.r.t. (M, C¯i). Detectability of the
pair (W(λj), C¯
(j)
i ) then follows readily from the PBH
test by noting the structure of the matrix M.
LetOi = {{λn1 , λ¯n1}, · · · , {λnpi , λ¯npi}, λnpi+1 , · · · , λnγi },
where the first pi pairs represent the non-real eigenval-
3 Throughout the rest of the paper, the terminology “z(j)[k]
corresponds to the eigenvalue λj” should be interpreted as
z(j)[k] corresponds to the eigenvalue pair {λj , λ¯j} for a non-
real eigenvalue λj ∈ sp(A).
ues, and λnpi+1 to λnγi represent the real eigenvalues of
A that are detectable w.r.t. the measurements of node
i. Let MOi = diag(W(λn1), · · · ,W(λnpi ),V(λnpi+1),
· · · ,V(λnγi )). Let COi represent the columns of C¯i cor-
responding to the matrix MOi , and zOi [k] denote the
portion of the state z[k] corresponding to the detectable
eigenvalues of node i, i.e., corresponding to Oi. Based
on Lemma 1, it is easy to see that the pair (MOi ,COi)
is detectable. Thus, a standard Luenberger observer can
be locally constructed by node i for estimating zOi [k].
The details of such a construction are straightforward,
and are similar to those in Section VI-A of [4]. We thus
skip minor details and state the following result which
will be useful later on.
Lemma 2 For each regular node i ∈ R and each λj ∈
Oi, a Luenberger observer can be locally constructed by
node i such that limk→∞ ||zˆ(j)i [k]− z(j)[k]|| = 0.
Based on the previous result, we see that a regular node
i can estimate certain portions of the state space with-
out having to exchange information with neighbors. The
challenge, however, lies in estimating the locally unde-
tectable portion of the state in the presence of adver-
saries. The following section presents a resilient consen-
sus based strategy to address this issue.
4.2 Local-Filtering Based Resilient Estimation
For any λj ∈ sp(A), let z(jm)[k] denote the m-th com-
ponent of the vector z(j)[k], and let zˆ
(jm)
i [k] denote the
estimate of that component maintained by node i ∈ V.
Consider an unstable eigenvalue λj ∈ Oi. For such an
eigenvalue, node i has to rely on the information received
from its neighbors, some of which might be adversarial,
in order to estimate z(j)[k]. To this end, we propose a
resilient consensus algorithm that requires each regular
node i ∈ V \ Sj to update its estimate of z(j)[k] using
the following two stage filtering strategy:
1) At each time-step k, each regular node i collects the
state estimates of z(j)[k] received from only those
neighbors that belong to a certain subset N (j)i ⊆ Ni
(to be defined later). For every component m of
z(j)[k], the estimates of z(jm)[k] received from nodes
in N (j)i are sorted from largest to smallest.
2) For each component m of z(j)[k], node i removes the
largest and smallest f estimates (i.e., removes 2f esti-
mates in all) of z(jm)[k] received from nodes in N (j)i ,
and computes the quantity:
z¯
(jm)
i [k] =
∑
l∈M(jm)
i
[k]
w
(jm)
il [k]zˆ
(jm)
l [k], (4)
whereM(jm)i [k] ⊂ N (j)i (⊆ Ni) is the set of nodes from
which node i chooses to accept estimates of z(jm)[k]
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at time-step k, after removing the f largest and f
smallest estimates of z(jm)[k] from N (j)i . Node i as-
signs the weight w
(jm)
il [k] to the l-th node at the k-
th time-step for estimating the m-th component of
z(j)[k]. The weights are nonnegative and chosen to sat-
isfy
∑
l∈M(jm)
i
[k]
w
(jm)
il [k] = 1,∀λj ∈ Oi and for each
component m of z(j)[k]. With the quantities z¯
(jm)
i [k]
in hand, node i updates zˆ
(j)
i [k] as follows:
zˆ
(j)
i [k + 1] =
{
V(λj)z¯
(j)
i [k], if λj ∈ Oi is real
W(λj)z¯
(j)
i [k], if λj ∈ Oi is not real,
(5)
where z¯
(j)
i [k] =
[
z¯
(j1)
i [k], · · · , z¯(jσj)i [k]
]T
, σj =
aA(λj) if λj ∈ Oi is real, and σj = 2aA(λj) if λj ∈ Oi
is not real.
We refer to the above algorithm as the Local-Filtering
based Resilient Estimation (LFRE) algorithm. For im-
plementing this algorithm, a regular node i needs to con-
struct the set N (j)i , ∀λj ∈ Oi, based on the relative po-
sitions of its neighbors (with respect to its own position)
in G. We will provide the exact definition of N (j)i , and a
distributed algorithm for constructing such a set in the
following sections where we analyze the convergence of
the LFRE algorithm. We conclude this section by com-
menting on certain features of the LFRE algorithm.
Remark 4 The rationale behind performing a real Jor-
dan canonical decomposition at every node (as opposed
to a standard Jordan transformation) is to ensure that
the state estimates featuring in equations (4) and (5) are
real at every time-step, thereby making the sorting opera-
tion performed in Step 1 of the algorithm meaningful. At
any time-step, if a regular node i either receives a non-
real estimate of z(jm)[k] from some node l ∈ N (j)i or does
not receive an estimate at all, it would immediately iden-
tify node l as an adversarial node, and simply assign a
0 value to node l’s estimate of z(jm)[k]. Note that every
regular node in N (j)i will always transmit a real estimate
to node i at every time-step.
Remark 5 The strategy of disregarding the most ex-
treme values in one’s neighborhood, and using a convex
combination of the rest for performing linear scalar up-
dates, has been used for designing resilient distributed
algorithms for consensus [33, 34, 43] and optimization
[35, 36] problems. In this paper, we show that such algo-
rithms can also be used for resilient distributed state esti-
mation, with certain substantial differences arising from
the fact that the nodes are trying to track the state of an
external dynamical system.
Remark 6 The consensus weights w
(jm)
il appearing in
equation (4) can be chosen arbitrarily to achieve an expo-
nential rate of convergence, as long as the weights meet
the rules specified by the LFRE algorithm. Since our pri-
mary focus is on resilience against worst-case adversarial
behavior, the problem of optimizing such weights (or ex-
ploiting sensor memory) for achieving improved perfor-
mance against noise is not considered in this paper. In a
non-adversarial setting (i.e., when f = 0), the proposed
LFRE algorithm will continue to guarantee exponential
convergence in the absence of noise, and bounded mean
square error in the presence of i.i.d. noise with bounded
second moments (provided the topological conditions out-
lined in Section 7 are met). However, disregarding the
estimates of certain neighbors in the absence of attacks
may potentially degrade performance against noise; we
do not delve deeper into this topic here.
It should be noted that the algorithmic development in
this section can be considerably simplified if more struc-
ture is imposed on the system matrix A (for instance,
the assumption made in [31] that A has only real, dis-
tinct eigenvalues).
5 Analysis of the Resilient Distributed Estima-
tion Strategy
In this section, we provide our main result concerning the
convergence of the LFRE algorithm. Let ΩU (A) , {λj ∈
ΛU (A)|V\Sj is non-empty}. By this definition, all nodes
are source nodes for each eigenvalue in ΛU (A) \ΩU (A),
and are hence capable of recovering the corresponding
portions of the state based on locally constructed Lu-
enberger observers (as discussed in Section 4.1). Conse-
quently, the LFRE algorithm specifically applies to only
those eigenvalues that belong to ΩU (A). Consider the
following definition.
Definition 8 (Mode Estimation Directed Acyclic
Graph (MEDAG)) Consider an eigenvalue λj ∈
ΩU (A). Suppose there exists a spanning subgraph
Gj = (V, Ej) of G with the following properties for all
f -local sets A and R = V \ A.
(i) If i ∈ {V \ Sj} ∩ R, then |N (j)i | ≥ 2f + 1, where
N (j)i = {l|(l, i) ∈ Ej} represents the neighborhood of
node i in Gj.
(ii) There exists a partition ofR into the sets {L(j)0 , · · · ,L(j)Tj },
where Tj ∈ N+, L(j)0 = Sj ∩R, and if i ∈ L(j)q (where
1 ≤ q ≤ Tj), then N (j)i ∩ R ⊆
⋃q−1
r=0 L(j)r . Further-
more, N (j)i = ∅,∀i ∈ L(j)0 .
Then, we call Gj a Mode Estimation Directed Acyclic
Graph (MEDAG) for λj ∈ ΩU (A).
An example of a MEDAG is shown in Figure 2. The “for
all A” in the definition accounts for the fact that the
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Fig. 2. A scalar unstable plant is monitored by a network
of 7 nodes as depicted by the figure on the left. Nodes 1, 2
and 3 are the source nodes for this system. The figure on the
right represents a subgraph of the original graph satisfying
the properties of a MEDAG in Definition 8 for all 1-local
sets (i.e., with f = 1). For example, when A = {1} (as
shown in the right figure), every non-source node has at least
2f + 1 = 3 neighbors. The levels that partition R = V \ A
are level 0 with nodes 2 and 3, level 1 with nodes 4, 5 and 6,
and level 2 with node 7. Each regular node has all its regular
neighbors in levels that are numbered lower than its own.
set of adversarial nodes during the process of state es-
timation is unknown, and hence can be any f -local set
of V. Note that Tj and the levels L(j)0 to L(j)Tj can vary
across different f -local sets. For a given f -local set A,
we say a regular node i ∈ L(j)m “belongs to level m”,
where the levels are indicative of the distances of the
regular nodes from the source set Sj . The first property
indicates that every regular node i ∈ V \ Sj has at least
(2f + 1) neighbors in the subgraph Gj , while the second
property indicates that all its regular neighbors in such
a subgraph belong to levels strictly preceding its own
level. In essence, the edges of the MEDAG Gj represent a
medium for transmitting information securely from the
source nodes Sj to the non-source nodes, by prevent-
ing the adversaries from forming a bottleneck between
such nodes. Intuitively, this requires redundant nodes
and edges, and such a requirement is met by the first
property of the MEDAG. In particular, as regards mea-
surement redundancy, it follows from the definition that
for each λj ∈ ΩU (A), a MEDAG Gj contains at least
(2f + 1) source nodes that can detect λj .
4 The LFRE
algorithm described in the previous section relies on a
special uni-directional information flow pattern that re-
quires a node i to listen to only its neighbors in N (j)i for
estimating z(j)[k]. The second property of a MEDAG
then indicates that nodes in level m only use the esti-
mates of regular nodes in levels 0 to m − 1 for recov-
ering z(j)[k]. The implications of the above properties
will become apparent in the proof of the following result
4 Recall from the discussion immediately following Proposi-
tion 1 that such a condition is in fact necessary for systems
with distinct eigenvalues.
which provides a sufficient condition for solving Problem
1 based on our approach.
Theorem 4 Suppose that G contains a MEDAG Gj for
each λj ∈ ΩU (A). Then, based on the LFRE dynam-
ics described by equations (4) and (5), each regular node
i ∈ R can asymptotically estimate the state of the plant,
despite the actions of any f -locally bounded set of Byzan-
tine adversaries.
The proof of the above theorem is given in Appendix
B. Notice that Theorem 4 hinges on the existence of
a MEDAG Gj , for each λj ∈ ΩU (A); in the following
section we describe an approach for checking whether a
given graph G contains such MEDAGs.
6 Checking the Existence of a MEDAG
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the
MEDAGs described in Definition 8 play a key role in
solving Problem 1 based on our proposed technique. In
particular, recall that for each λj ∈ ΩU (A), the LFRE
algorithm described in Section 4.2 requires a regular
node i ∈ V\Sj to accept estimates from only its neighbor
set N (j)i in the MEDAG Gj for estimating z(j)[k]. With
these points in mind, our immediate goal in this sec-
tion will be to develop a distributed algorithm, namely
Algorithm 1, that constructs a MEDAG Gj for each
λj ∈ ΩU (A), and in the process enables each regular
node i to determine the set N (j)i for each λj ∈ Oi. The
construction of these MEDAGs constitutes the initial-
ization phase of our design, which can then be followed
up by the LFRE algorithm described earlier. We briefly
describe the implementation of Algorithm 1 as follows.
Algorithm 1 requires each node i to maintain a counter
ci(j) and a list of indices N (j)i for each λj ∈ ΩU (A).
The nodes in N (j)i ⊆ Ni will be the parents of node i in
the DAG constructed for the estimation of z(j)[k]. Al-
gorithm 1 is initialized with ci(j) = 0 and N (j)i = ∅,
for each i ∈ V. Subsequently, the algorithm proceeds in
rounds where in the first round each node in Sj broad-
casts the message “1” to its out-neighbors, sets ci(j) = 1,
maintains N (j)i = ∅ for all future rounds, and goes to
sleep. Each node i ∈ V \ Sj waits until it has received
“1” from at least (2f + 1) distinct neighbors, at which
point it sets ci(j) = 1, appends the labels of each of
the neighbors from which it received “1” toN (j)i , broad-
casts the message “1” to its out-neighbors, and goes to
sleep. Let R′ ⊆ V denote the set of nodes that behave
regularly during the execution of Algorithm 1. We say
that the MEDAG construction algorithm “terminates
for λj” if there exists Tj ∈ N+ such that ci(j) = 1
∀i ∈ R′, for all rounds following round Tj . The objec-
tive of the algorithm is to return a set of sets {N (j)i },
where λj ∈ ΩU (A), and i ∈ V.
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Algorithm 1 MEDAG Construction Algorithm
For each eigenvalue λj ∈ ΩU (A) do:
Initialization: Initialize ci(j) = 0, N (j)i = ∅, ∀i ∈ V.
Each node determines whether it belongs to Sj .
Actions of the source nodes: Each node in Sj up-
dates its counter value ci(j) = 1, and transmits the
message “1” to its out-neighbors. Following this step,
it does not listen to any other node, i.e., N (j)i = ∅ and
ci(j) = 1, ∀i ∈ Sj for the remainder of the algorithm.
Actions of the non-source nodes: Each node i ∈
V \ Sj does the following:
• If ci(j) = 0 and node i has received “1” from at
least (2f + 1) distinct neighbors (not necessarily all
in the same round), it updates ci(j) to 1, appends
the labels of the neighbors from which it received
“1” toN (j)i , and transmits “1” to its out-neighbors.• If ci(j) = 1, it discards all messages received from
its neighbors, i.e., it does not update ci(j) or N (j)i .
Return : A set of sets {N (j)i }, λj ∈ ΩU (A), i ∈ V.
We emphasize that in addition to misbehavior during the
state estimation phase (run-time), an adversarial node
is allowed to misbehave during the implementation of
Algorithm 1 (design-time) as well. For example, it can
transmit the message out of turn, i.e., before receiving
“1” from at least (2f + 1) neighbors. It can also choose
not to transmit the message at all. Note however that
we must have V \ R′ ⊆ A, i.e., the f -local set of ad-
versaries during the estimation phase must contain the
set of adversaries during the design phase. In the next
section, we shall detail graph conditions that guarantee
the termination of the MEDAG construction algorithm
under arbitrary adversarial behavior. For the following
discussion, we characterize the properties of the output
of Algorithm 1 if it terminates. To this end, consider
the spanning subgraph Gj = (V, Ej) induced by the sets
{N (j)i } returned by Algorithm 1. Keeping in mind thatR′ ⊇ R represents the set of nodes that behave regularly
during the execution of Algorithm 1, we have the follow-
ing results; proofs of these results can be found in [31].
Proposition 2 Suppose Algorithm 1 terminates for
some λj ∈ ΩU (A), and returns the sets {N (j)i }. Then,
the spanning subgraph Gj induced by these sets contains
no directed cycles where every node belongs to R′.
Let L(j)m−1 denote the set of all nodes in R′ that update
their counter value from 0 to 1 in round m of Algorithm
1, i.e., L(j)0 = Sj ∩R′, and so on. 5
Proposition 3 Suppose Algorithm 1 terminates for
some λj ∈ ΩU (A). Let Tj denote the smallest integer
5 Note that the method developed in this paper allows even
some of the source nodes in Sj to be adversarial.
such that in round Tj, ci(j) = 1 ∀i ∈ R′. Then, the sets
{L(j)0 , · · · ,L(j)Tj } form a partition of the set R′ in Gj.
Theorem 5 Suppose the MEDAG construction algo-
rithm terminates for λj ∈ ΩU (A). Then, there exists a
subgraph Gj satisfying the properties of a MEDAG for
all f -local sets A that contain V \ R′ as a subset.
PROOF. The result follows immediately from Propo-
sitions 2 and 3.
Remark 7 Based on the above theorem, we make the fol-
lowing observations. If Algorithm 1 terminates for each
λj ∈ ΩU (A), and V \R′ = ∅, then the Gj subgraphs sat-
isfy all the properties of a MEDAG and we can directly
invoke Theorem 4. If Algorithm 1 terminates for each
λj ∈ ΩU (A) and V \ R′ 6= ∅, (i.e., there is some adver-
sarial activity during the MEDAG construction phase),
then we do not need to provide any guarantees of state
estimation for the set of misbehaving nodes V \R′, since
V \ R′ ⊆ A. In this case too, the subgraphs returned
by Algorithm 1 have enough redundancy to ensure that
Problem 1 can be solved based on our proposed approach;
this fact can be established using arguments identical to
those used for proving Theorem 4. In what follows, we
summarize our overall approach.
6.1 Summary of the Resilient Distributed State Esti-
mation Scheme
1) Each regular node i ∈ R performs the coordinate
transformation z[k] = T−1x[k] described in Section
4.1; accordingly, it identifies its detectable and unde-
tectable eigenvalues (Oi and Oi respectively).
2) The MEDAG construction algorithm described by Al-
gorithm 1 is implemented for each λj ∈ ΩU (A); graph
conditions for termination of this algorithm are pro-
vided in the next section. At the end of this algorithm,
each regular node i knows the subset N (j)i of neigh-
bors it should use in the LFRE algorithm.
3) Each regular node i employs a locally constructed
Luenberger observer (refer to Lemma 2 and the dis-
cussion preceding it) for estimating zOi [k], namely
the portion of the state z[k] corresponding to its de-
tectable eigenvalues.
4) Each regular node i employs the LFRE algorithm gov-
erned by equations (4) and (5) for estimating zOi [k],
namely the portion of the state z[k] corresponding to
its undetectable eigenvalues.
Remark 8 Whereas steps 1 and 2 correspond to the ini-
tial design phase of our scheme, steps 3 and 4 consti-
tute the estimation phase. A key benefit of the proposed
method is that if certain graph-theoretic conditions (to be
discussed in the following section) are met, then our over-
all scheme provably admits a fully distributed imple-
mentation even under worst-case adversarial behavior.
10
7 Feasible Graph Topologies
In this section, we characterize feasible graph topolo-
gies that guarantee the termination of the MEDAG con-
struction algorithm described in the previous section. In
other words, based on Remark 7, feasible graph topolo-
gies guarantee that Problem 1 can be solved based on
our proposed approach (summarized in Section 6.1). We
first recall the following definition from [34,43].
Definition 9 (r-reachable set) For a graph G =
(V, E), a set S ⊂ V, and an integer r ∈ N+, S is
an r-reachable set if there exists an i ∈ S such that
|Ni \ S| ≥ r,
Thus, if a set S is r-reachable, then it contains a node
which has at least r neighbors outside S. We modify the
notion of a strongly-r robust graph from [43] as follows.
Definition 10 (strongly r-robust graph w.r.t. Sj)
For r ∈ N+ and λj ∈ ΩU (A), a graph G = (V, E) is
strongly r-robust w.r.t. to the set of source nodes Sj, if
for any non-empty subset C ⊆ V \ Sj, C is r-reachable.
For an illustration of the above definitions, the reader is
referred back to Figure 2. Figure 2(a) is an example of a
network that is strongly 3-robust w.r.t. the set of source
nodes, namely nodes {1, 2, 3}. Specifically, all subsets of
{4, 5, 6, 7} are 3-reachable (i.e., each such subset has a
node that has at least 3 neighbors outside that subset).
Lemma 3 The MEDAG construction algorithm termi-
nates for λj ∈ ΩU (A) if G is strongly (3f + 1)-robust
w.r.t. Sj.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Consider any λj ∈
ΩU (A) and let G be strongly (3f + 1)-robust w.r.t. the
set of source nodes Sj . Suppose that the MEDAG con-
struction algorithm for λj does not terminate. Since the
possibility of the counter ci(j) oscillating between 0 and
1 (where i ∈ R) is ruled out based on our MEDAG con-
struction algorithm, there must then exist a non-empty
set C ⊆ V \ Sj of regular nodes that never update their
counter ci(j) from 0 to 1, where i ∈ C. As G is strongly
(3f + 1)-robust w.r.t. Sj , it follows that C is (3f + 1)-
reachable, i.e., there exists a node i ∈ C which has at
least (3f + 1) neighbors outside C. Under the f -local
adversarial model, at least (2f + 1) of them are regu-
lar nodes with ci(j) = 1. Thus, at least (2f + 1) regular
nodes must have transmitted the message “1” to node
i. Thus, based on the rules of Algorithm 1, node i must
have updated ci(j) from 0 to 1 at some point of time,
leading to a contradiction.
Whereas the (2f + 1) term appears in various contexts
when dealing with security problems on networks (such
as distributed consensus [33, 34], broadcasting [37, 38]
and optimization [35, 36]), the (3f + 1) term featuring
in our analysis accounts for misbehavior that involves
transmission of no messages by the adversarial nodes
during execution of the MEDAG construction algorithm
described in Section 6. We now present the main result
of this paper which ties together the previous results
presented in this paper, and in turn provides a connec-
tion between feasible graph topologies and the solution
to Problem 1 based on our proposed approach.
Theorem 6 Consider an LTI system (1) and a mea-
surement model (2). Let the communication graph G be
strongly (3f + 1)-robust w.r.t. Sj ,∀λj ∈ ΩU (A). Then,
the proposed algorithm summarized in Section 6.1 pro-
vides a solution to Problem 1.
Proof. From Lemma 3, it follows that if G is strongly
(3f + 1)-robust w.r.t. Sj for every λj ∈ ΩU (A), then
the MEDAG construction algorithm terminates for each
such eigenvalue. Combining Theorem 5, Remark 7 and
Theorem 4 then leads to the desired result.
If the adversarial attacks are restricted to the estimation
phase only, i.e., if there are no attacks during the initial
MEDAG construction phase, then the following result
provides a tight graph condition for our algorithm.
Theorem 7 Consider an LTI system (1) and a mea-
surement model (2). Suppose adversarial behavior is re-
stricted to the estimation phase (steps 3 and 4) of the pro-
posed algorithm summarized in Section 6.1. Then, this
algorithm solves Problem 1 if and only if G is strongly
(2f + 1)-robust w.r.t. Sj, ∀λj ∈ ΩU (A).
The proof of the above result is given in Appendix C.
Essentially, Theorem 7 alludes to the fact that G con-
tains a MEDAG Gj for each λj ∈ ΩU (A) if and only if
G is strongly (2f + 1)-robust w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ ΩU (A).
Note that although Theorem 7 provides a graph condi-
tion that is necessary and sufficient for the algorithm
developed in this paper, such a condition may not be
necessary for solving Problem 1 in general.
Theorems 6 and 7 reveal that ‘strong r-robustness w.r.t.
Sj , ∀λj ∈ ΩU (A)’ is the key topological property re-
quired for guaranteeing success of our proposed algo-
rithm. Accordingly, given a system model (1) and mea-
surement model (2), a network that is strongly r-robust
w.r.t. Sj , ∀λj ∈ ΩU (A), will be called an ‘r-feasible net-
work ’ for simplicity. We summarize certain features of
an r-feasible network in the following result.
Proposition 4 An r-feasible network G has the follow-
ing properties.
(i) The graph G′ = (V ∪ vnew, E ∪ Enew), where vnew is a
new vertex added to G and Enew is the edge set associ-
ated with vnew, is an r-feasible network if |Nvnew | ≥ r.
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(ii) r ≤ minλj∈ΩU (A) |Sj |.
(iii) Let S = ⋂λj∈ΩU (A) Sj. Then |Ni| ≥ r, ∀i ∈ V \ S.
(iv) Removal of a k-local set from G, where 0 < k < r,
results in a network G′ that is (r − k)-feasible.
Proof. (i) Consider any λj ∈ ΩU (A). If vnew is a source
node for λj , then it is easily seen that G′ is strongly r-
robust w.r.t. Sj . For the case when vnew is not a source
node for λj , consider any non-empty set C ⊆ {V∪vnew}\
Sj . If C = {vnew}, then r-reachability of C follows from
the fact that |Nvnew | ≥ r. In every other case, C con-
tains some nodes of the original graph G and is hence r-
reachable as G is r-feasible. Thus G′ is strongly r-robust
w.r.t. Sj . A similar analysis holds for each λj ∈ ΩU (A),
leading to the desired result.
(ii) Suppose r > |Sρ| where ρ = arg minλj∈ΩU (A) |Sj |.
Since the set C = V \ Sρ can be at most |Sρ|-reachable
and |Sρ| < r, it follows that G is not r-feasible.
(iii) Suppose i ∈ V \S with |Ni| < r. As i ∈ V \S, there
exists some λj ∈ ΩU (A) such that i ∈ V \ Sj . Consider
the set C = {i}. As |Ni| < r, the set C is not r-reachable.
Thus, G is not strongly r-robust w.r.t. Sj , implying that
G is not r-feasible.
(iv) First, observe that as G is r-feasible and k < r,
removal of a k-local set from G cannot cause the removal
of an entire source node net Sj for any λj ∈ ΩU (A).
This follows from noting that any source set Sj where
λj ∈ ΩU (A) (or any set containing Sj) will have an
overlap of at least r nodes with the neighborhood of some
non-source node owing to the r-feasibility of the original
network. As r > k, such sets are not k-local. Next, pick
any λj ∈ ΩU (A) and let C be a non-empty subset of
V ′ \ Sj
′
, where V ′ and Sj
′
represent the vertex set and
source node set for λj , respectively, in G′ . Since C was r-
reachable in G, it contained some node v with r neighbors
outside C. While constructing G′ , node v can lose at most
k of such neighbors, and hence C is (r − k)-reachable in
G′ . The rest of the proof follows trivially.
We remark on certain implications of the above result.
The first property provides a procedure for constructing
r-feasible networks withN nodes (whereN > r) starting
from r-feasible networks with fewer than N nodes. The
second property shows that the measurement structure
of the nodes provides an upper bound on the robustness
of the overall network. The third property places a lower
bound on the minimum in-degree of any node that can-
not estimate the entire state on its own in an r-feasible
network. Finally, a direct implication of the fourth prop-
erty is that a loss of k source nodes (where k < r) for any
unstable eigenvalue of the system (possibly due to sen-
sor failures) leaves the resulting network at least (r−k)-
feasible if the original network is r-feasible to begin with.
Applicability of the Proposed Approach: Building
on the insights developed in this section, we make a case
for the applicability of the approach developed in this pa-
per by addressing the following question: How efficiently
can one verify whether a given system and network is
r-feasible? To answer the above question we will exploit
a connection between the ‘strong r-robustness property
w.r.t. a certain set of nodes’ and the dynamic process of
‘bootstrap percolation’ on networks [44]. Given a graph
G and a threshold r ≥ 2, bootstrap percolation can be
viewed as a process of spread of activation where one
starts off with a set I ⊆ V of initially active nodes. Sub-
sequently, the process evolves over the network based on
the rule that an inactive node becomes active if and only
if it has at least r active neighbors, with active nodes
remaining active forever. The process terminates when
no more nodes become active; an initial set I is said to
percolate if upon termination the final active set equals
the entire node set V. Consider the following simple, yet
key observation.
Lemma 4 Given a graph G and a threshold r ≥ 2, an
initial set I percolates via the process of bootstrap perco-
lation if and only if G is strongly r-robust w.r.t. I.
The proof of the above result follows similar arguments
as Lemma 3, and is hence omitted. Leveraging Lemma
4, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 Given a system matrix A ∈ Rn×n (1),
a measurement model (2), a communication graph G =
(V, E) with |V| = N , the source set Sj for each λj ∈
sp(A), and an integer r ≥ 2, one can verify whether the
network is r-feasible in O(nN |E|) time.
Proof. Notice that |ΩU (A)| ≤ n, i.e., there are at most
n source sets Sj for which we need to verify the strong r-
robustness property in Definition 10. Based on Lemma
4, for each Sj corresponding to some λj ∈ ΩU (A), ver-
ifying whether G is strongly r-robust w.r.t. Sj is equiv-
alent to verifying whether Sj percolates via the process
of bootstrap percolation with threshold r. Thus, we an-
alyze the complexity of simulating a bootstrap percola-
tion process on a given network. 6 First, notice that it
takes at mostN iterations/rounds for a bootstrap perco-
lation process to terminate on a network of N nodes. In
each round, every inactive node checks whether it has at
least r active neighbors; the entire process of checking is
thus completed in O(
∑N
i=1 di) = O(|E|) time, where di
represents the in-degree of node i. Thus, for a given ini-
tial set, it takes O(N |E|) time to simulate the bootstrap
percolation process. The result then follows readily.
6 Algorithm 1 essentially simulates the evolution of a boot-
strap percolation process with threshold r = (2f + 1), pro-
vided there is no adversarial activity during the distributed
implementation of such an algorithm.
12
(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Consider the system and network in Fig. 2. Fig. (a)
depicts how a single adversary, namely node 1, can cause the
estimation errors of all the non-source regular nodes (namely,
nodes 4-7) to diverge when a non-resilient distributed ob-
server is employed. Fig. (b) shows hows the proposed LFRE
algorithm counteracts the effect of the adversary.
Remark 9 Based on the above result, one can check
whether the approach developed in this paper is appli-
cable for a given system and network in polynomial
time. 7 Interestingly, leveraging the equivalence described
in Lemma 4, it is possible to show that the strong r-
robustness property described in Definition 10 is exhib-
ited by various large-scale complex network models such
as the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) preferential attachment
model, the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph model, and the 2-
dimensional random geometric graph model. A detailed
discussion on this topic can be found in Appendix D.
8 Simulations
Consider the system and network given by Figure 2. The
state evolves as x[k + 1] = ax[k], with a = 2. Nodes 1,
2 and 3 are the source nodes and directly estimate the
state, i.e., yi[k] = x[k],∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The rest of the
nodes have zero measurements. Node 1 is the only ad-
versarial node in the network, and it simply transmits
a constant signal of magnitude  = 0.001 to each of its
neighbors at every time-step. Each regular source node
updates its state estimate based on a standard Luen-
berger observer as follows:
xˆi[k + 1] = axˆi[k] + li(yi[k]− xˆi[k]), i ∈ {2, 3}, (6)
with the observer gain li set to 1.5 (this gain is sim-
ply chosen to ensure stability). We first consider a sce-
nario where each non-source node updates its estimate
as follows: xˆi[k + 1] = a
∑
l∈N (j)
i
w
(j)
il xˆl[k], where the
weights form a convex combination, andN (j)i represents
the neighbors of node i in the MEDAG shown in Figure
2(b). 8 If node 1 were to update its estimate as per (6),
7 This result is in stark contrast with analogous results
existing in the resilient distributed consensus [33, 34] and
optimization [35, 36] literature, since checking the ‘robust-
ness’ condition needed for solving such problems is coNP-
complete.
8 For this scalar system, there is only one mode, i.e., j = 1.
then it can be easily verified analytically that all nodes
would be able to track the state asymptotically (see [4]
for details). However, as seen from Figure 3(a), a sin-
gle adversarial node (node 1 in this case) transmitting
a small constant signal can cause the estimates of all
the non-source nodes to diverge. This example demon-
strates that although the underlying network is strongly
3-robust (i.e., has enough built-in redundancy to deal
with a single adversarial node 9 ), the non-resilient dis-
tributed observer employed above proves to be inade-
quate in the face of attacks. However, as seen from Fig-
ure 3(b), the LFRE algorithm complements the robust
network structure and succeeds in counteracting the ad-
versarial attack. For all simulations, x[0] = 0.5, and
xˆi[0], i ∈ V is a random number between 0 and 1.
9 Conclusions
We studied the problem of collaboratively estimating the
state of an LTI system subject to worst-case adversarial
behavior. For the attack models under consideration, we
identified certain necessary conditions that need to be
satisfied by any system and network for the problem
posed in this paper to have a feasible solution. We then
developed a local-filtering algorithm to enable each non-
compromised node to recover the entire state. Finally,
using a topological property called strong r-robustness,
we characterized networks that guarantee success of our
proposed strategy. Two notable features of our approach
are as follows: (i) each step of our approach admits an
attack-resilient, completely distributed implementation
provided certain graph-theoretic conditions are met; and
(ii) these graph-theoretic conditions can be checked in
polynomial time as discussed in the previous section.
There are various interesting directions for future re-
search, some of which were pointed out in Remark 3.
Finding an algorithm-independent necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the problem posed in this paper will
likely be a challenging proposition. Whereas the focus
of this paper has been on obtaining sufficient graph-
theoretic conditions that account for worst-case adver-
sarial behavior, it might be of interest to see if such con-
ditions can be relaxed when confronted with less sophis-
ticated adversarial attacks. Extensions of our framework
to account for network-induced issues such as packet-
drops, delays and asynchronicity also merit attention;
see [45] for preliminary results on this topic.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. “(i)=⇒(ii)” We prove by contraposition. Suppose
statement (ii) is violated for some node i ∈ V, i.e., there
exists a set Di such that its removal from G causes the
pair (A,Ci∪Pi) to become undetectable (where Di andPi have the same meaning as in the statement of Theo-
rem 2). It then follows that F = V \ {i∪Pi} is a critical
set. Suppose it is also a minimal critical set. We con-
struct G′ by adding directed edges from a virtual node s
to each node in F . 10 Observe that H = Di satisfies all
the properties of an f -total pair cut w.r.t. s. In particu-
lar, Y = {i ∪ Pi} and X = {V \ {Di ∪ Y}} ∪ {s}. Thus,
statement (i) is violated. A similar argument holds when
F contains a minimal critical set.
“(i)⇐=(ii)” We again prove by contraposition. Suppose
statement (i) is violated, i.e., there exists an f -total pair
cutH w.r.t. a virtual node s corresponding to some min-
imal critical set F . Consider a node i in Y (recall that Y
is non-empty based on Definition 6). First consider the
case when node i is not reachable from any node in H
in the graph G. It then follows that in the graph G, di-
rected paths to node i can only exist from the set Y. But
since i ∈ Y and (A,CY) is not detectable, it is trivially
impossible for node i to estimate the state. We thus fo-
cus on the case where node i is reachable from a certain
set of nodes, say Di, within the set H. Since |H| ≤ 2f
and Di ⊆ H, we have that |Di| ≤ 2f . It can be easily ar-
gued that the removal of Di from G results in an induced
subgraph where node i can only be reached from the set
Y. In other words, the set Pi, as defined in the state-
ment of Theorem 2, is a subset of Y. As (A,CY) is not
detectable, it follows that (A,Ci∪Pi) is not detectable
either, and thus statement (ii) is violated.
B Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. Let A be the (unknown) set of f -local adver-
saries, and consider R = V \ A. Given a node i ∈ R,
the state vector z[k] can be partitioned into the com-
ponents zOi [k] and zOi [k] that correspond to the de-
tectable and undetectable eigenvalues, respectively, of
node i. Based on Lemma 2, we know that node i can
estimate zOi [k] asymptotically via a locally constructed
Luenberger observer. It remains to show that node i can
recover zOi [k], or in other words, for each λj ∈ Oi, we
need to prove that limk→∞ ||zˆ(j)i [k] − z(j)[k]|| = 0. To
this end, consider a non-real eigenvalue λj ∈ ΩU (A).
As G contains a MEDAG for each λj ∈ ΩU (A), the sets
{L(j)0 ,L(j)1 , · · · ,L(j)q , · · · L(j)Tj } form a partition of the set
R. We prove that each node in R can asymptotically
estimate z(j)[k] by inducting on the level number q.
For q = 0, by definition of the set L(j)0 , all nodes in L(j)0
are regular and belong to the set Sj , i.e., λj ∈ Oi for each
node i in L(j)0 . Thus, by Lemma 2, each node in level 0
can estimate z(j)[k] asymptotically. Notice that for any
node i belonging to a level q, where 1 ≤ q ≤ Tj , we
10 Throughout this proof, we drop the subscript on G′ ,F and
s, unlike the notation in Section 3. This is done since the
subscript i is used to denote sets defined w.r.t. a node i in
this proof.
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have λj ∈ Oi. Consider a node i in L(j)1 and let its error
in estimation of the component z(jm)[k] be denoted by
e
(jm)
i [k] , zˆ
(jm)
i [k] − z(jm)[k]. The estimation errors of
the individual components are aggregated in the vector
e
(j)
i [k] = zˆ
(j)
i [k] − z(j)[k]. Subtracting z(j)[k + 1] from
both sides of equation (5), noting that z(j)[k + 1] =
W(λj)z
(j)[k] (based on the dynamics given by (3)), and
using (4), we obtain
e
(j)
i [k + 1] = W(λj)

∑
l∈M(j1)
i
[k]
w
(j1)
il [k]e
(j1)
l [k]
...∑
l∈M(jσj)
i
[k]
w
(jσj)
il [k]e
(jσj)
l [k]

︸ ︷︷ ︸
e¯
(j)
i
[k]
, (B.1)
where σj = 2aA(λj) (since λj is non-real). For arriving
at (B.1), we used the fact that
∑
l∈M(jm)
i
[k]
w
(jm)
il [k] = 1
for every component m of z(j)[k]. We now analyze the
error dynamics (B.1). To this end, for each component
m of the vector z(j)[k], we partition the set N (j)i into
the sets U (jm)i [k], J (jm)i [k], andM(jm)i [k], such that the
sets U (jm)i [k] and J (jm)i [k] contain f nodes each, with
the highest and lowest estimate values for z(jm)[k] re-
spectively, transmitted to node i at time-step k, and
M(jm)i [k] contains the rest of the nodes in N (j)i . Ac-
cording to the update rule (4), node i only uses esti-
mates from the set M(jm)i [k] (which is non-empty at
all time-steps based on the properties of a MEDAG)
to compute the quantity z¯
(jm)
i [k]. Now, for any compo-
nent m of z(j)[k], consider the following two cases. (i)
M(jm)i [k] ∩ A = ∅, i.e., there are no adversarial nodes
in the set M(jm)i [k]: in this case, all the nodes in the set
M(jm)i [k] are regular and belong to L(j)0 (as N (j)i ∩R ⊆
L(j)0 ). (ii) M(jm)i [k] ∩ A is non-empty, i.e., there are
some adversarial nodes in the set M(jm)i [k]: based on
the f -local adversarial model, it is apparent that each
of the sets U (jm)i [k] and J (jm)i [k] contain at least one
regular node belonging to L(j)0 . Let u and v be two such
regular nodes belonging to U (jm)i [k] and J (jm)i [k], re-
spectively. Based on the definitions of the sets U (jm)i [k],
J (jm)i [k], and M(jm)i [k], we have zˆ(jm)v [k] ≤ zˆ(jm)l [k] ≤
zˆ
(jm)
u [k], and hence e
(jm)
v [k] ≤ e(jm)l [k] ≤ e(jm)u [k], for
every node l ∈M(jm)i [k]. In particular, since u, v ∈ L(j)0 ,
it follows that for any node l ∈ M(jm)i [k], e(jm)min [k] ≤
e
(jm)
l [k] ≤ e(jm)max [k], where e(jm)min [k] = minu∈L(j)0 e
(jm)
u [k]
and e
(jm)
max [k] = maxu∈L(j)0
e
(jm)
u [k]. This property holds
for every component m of z(j)[k]. Analyzing each of the
two cases, we infer that at every time-step k, each com-
ponent of the vector e¯
(j)
i [k] in (B.1) lies in the convex
hull of the corresponding components of the error vec-
tors e
(j)
u [k], u ∈ L(j)0 = Sj ∩ R. Based on Lemma 2, we
have that limk→∞ e
(j)
u [k] = 0, ∀u ∈ Sj ∩ R, and hence
it follows that zˆ
(j)
i [k] converges asymptotically to z
(j)[k]
for every regular node i in L(j)1 .
Suppose the result holds for all levels from 0 to q (where
1 ≤ q ≤ Tj−1). It is easy to see that the result holds for
all regular nodes in L(j)q+1 as well, by noting the following.
(i) A regular node i ∈ L(j)q+1 has N (j)i ∩ R ⊆
⋃q
r=0 L(j)r .
(ii) For each i ∈ L(j)q+1, a similar analysis reveals that at
every every time-step k, each component of the vector
e¯
(j)
i [k] lies in the convex hull of the corresponding com-
ponents of the error vectors e
(j)
u [k], u ∈ ⋃qr=0 L(j)r . The
desired result then follows from the induction hypoth-
esis. An identical argument can be sketched for a real
eigenvalue λj ∈ ΩU (A), and thus the result holds for
any λj ∈ ΩU (A). We arrive at the conclusion that every
node i ∈ R can asymptotically estimate z(j)[k] for every
eigenvalue λj ∈ Oi. Thus, each node i ∈ R can asymp-
totically estimate z[k], and hence x[k] = Tz[k].
C Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. For sufficiency, it is easily noted that the condi-
tions stated in the theorem guarantee termination of the
MEDAG construction algorithm for every λj ∈ ΩU (A).
The rest of the proof for sufficiency follows identical ar-
guments as the proof of Theorem 6.
For proving necessity, we first note that the proposed al-
gorithm summarized in Section 6.1 is applicable only if
the MEDAG construction algorithm (Algorithm 1) ter-
minates for each λj ∈ ΩU (A) and returns a subgraph Gj
satisfying the properties of a MEDAG for all f -local sets
containing V \R′. Here R′ denotes the set of nodes that
behave regularly during the execution of Algorithm 1.
Based on the hypothesis of the theorem, since R′ = V,
the existence of a MEDAG Gj ∀λj ∈ ΩU (A) is necessary
in this case for running the LFRE algorithm. The rest of
the proof proceeds via contradiction. Suppose G is not
strongly (2f + 1)-robust w.r.t. Sj for some λj ∈ ΩU (A)
and yet there exists a MEDAG Gj for λj . Since G is not
strongly (2f + 1)-robust w.r.t. λj , there exists a non-
empty set C ⊆ V \ Sj that is not (2f + 1)-reachable.
Consider the trivial f -local set A = ∅. The subgraph Gj
must contain a partition of R = V \ A = V into levels
that satisfy the second property of a MEDAG in Defini-
tion 8. With this point in mind, let C be partitioned as
C = ⋃qr=1 Fr, where Fr = C ∩ L(j)nr for some set of in-
tegers {n1, · · · , nq|1 ≤ ni ≤ Tj ∀i ∈ {1, · · · , q}}. Here,
{L(j)nr }qr=1 represents a subset of the levels that partitionR in the MEDAG Gj (that exists based on the hypothe-
sis). Without loss of generality, let n1 < n2 < · · · < nq.
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Then, from the definition of a MEDAG, it follows that
for any i ∈ Fn1 , N (j)i contains elements from only V \ C.
As C is not (2f+1)-reachable, |N (j)i | < (2f+1), thereby
violating the first property of a MEDAG in Definition
8. We thus arrive at a contradiction, and the proof is
complete.
D The Strong r-robustness Property of Ran-
dom Graphs
The focus of this section is to address the following
question. Given a dynamical system and an associated
large-scale complex sensor network monitoring the sys-
tem, under what conditions is the system and network
pair r-feasible? To provide an answer to this question,
we study the ‘strong r-robustness’ property in three rel-
atively common random graph models for large-scale
complex networks, namely the Baraba´si-Albert (BA)
preferential attachment model, the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random
graph model, and the 2-dimensional random geometric
graph model.
Consider a scenario where we are given a dynamical sys-
tem and an associated wireless sensor network such that
the system and network pair is r-feasible, and hence,
resilient to adversarial attacks. We wish to expand the
network via addition of more sensors without disrupting
the r-feasibility property, i.e., we intend to tolerate the
same number of adversaries as earlier. As the first prop-
erty in Proposition 4 suggests, this can be achieved by
continually adding new nodes with incoming edges from
at least r nodes in the existing network. The specific con-
struction where the neighbors of a new node are selected
with a probability proportional to the number of edges
they already have leads to the BA preferential attach-
ment model. Such a model is thought of as a plausible
mechanism for the formation of many real-world com-
plex networks [46]. Based on our foregoing discussion, it
then follows that such real-world networks would facili-
tate the LFRE dynamics introduced in Section 4.2, and
would hence be resilient to the worst-case attack model
considered in this paper.
Next, we turn our attention to one of the most common
mathematical models for large-scale networks, namely
Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graphs [47]. We denote an Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random graph on N nodes by GN,p, where all pos-
sible edges between pairs of different nodes are present
independently and with the same probability p. We fur-
ther note that p is in general a function of the network
size N . From the perspective of a network designer, we
will be interested in answering the following questions.
(i) How should the size of the source sets Sj (for each
λj ∈ ΩU (A)) scale with the size of the network to main-
tain r-feasibility in an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph? (ii)
Which nodes should be chosen as the source nodes? Prior
to answering these questions, we briefly remark on the
notation to be used for the remainder of this section.
The term w.h.p. (with high probability) will be used for
events with probability tending to 1 as N → ∞. Given
two non-negative sequences aN and bN , the notation
aN  bN will convey the same meaning as aN = o(bN ).
To make use of Lemma 4, we first recall a few definitions
from [44]. Given an integer r ≥ 2, define
Tc(N, p) ,
(
(r − 1)!
Npr
) 1
(r−1)
, Ac(N) ,
(
1− 1
r
)
Tc(N, p).
(D.1)
We have the following result for an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random
graph model.
Proposition 6 Given an LTI system (1), a measure-
ment model (2), and a network modeled by an Erdo˝s-
Re´nyi random graph GN,p, suppose that for each λj ∈
ΩU (A), the source set Sj(N) is chosen randomly. 11
Then, the following are true.
(i) Let p = p(N) be such that N−1  p N− 1r . If for
each λj ∈ ΩU (A), |Sj(N)|Ac(N) ≥ 1 + δ, for some δ > 0,
and |Sj(N)| ≤ N2 , then GN,p is r-feasible w.h.p. if
and only if Np − (lnN + (r − 1)ln lnN) → ∞ as
N →∞.
(ii) Let p = p(N) be such that p  N− 1r . If for each
λj ∈ ΩU (A), |Sj(N)| ≥ r, then GN,p is r-feasible
w.h.p.
Proof. (i) If the conditions in part (i) are met, then for
each λj ∈ ΩU (A), Sj percolates via bootstrap percola-
tion with threshold r on GN,p w.h.p. based on [44, The-
orem 3.2]. Lemma 4 then implies that GN,p is strongly
r-robust w.r.t. each such source set Sj w.h.p., i.e., GN,p
is r-feasible w.h.p. . The proof for part (ii) follows simi-
larly by leveraging [44, Theorem 5.8] and Lemma 4.
Remark 10 We glean the following insights from the
above result. First, we observe that if either condition (i)
or condition (ii) is met, then our proposed algorithm will
enable each regular node to asymptotically estimate the
state of the system w.h.p. in the presence of any b r−13 c
locally-bounded set of Byzantine adversaries. This is a
direct consequence of Theorem 6. The first part of Propo-
sition 6 indicates that although the source sets can be
chosen randomly, their size needs to scale appropriately
with the size of the network to maintain r-feasibility. The
second part states that if the probability of edge forma-
tion is large enough, then it suffices to pick source sets
of constant size equal to the bare minimum required for
11 By choosing Sj(N) randomly, we imply that the measure-
ment set needed to detect λj is allocated to |Sj(N)| nodes
picked uniformly at random. The notation Sj(N) is used to
explicitly point out that the size of the source sets scales
with the size of the network.
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achieving r-feasibility (which equals r based on part (ii)
of Proposition 4).
Among the three random graph models mentioned
earlier, the one most relevant to our cause is the two-
dimensional random geometric graph (RGG) model [48].
RGGs are typically used to model networks where a
notion of spatial proximity governs the interaction be-
tween the nodes. A wireless sensor network where ran-
domly deployed nodes communicate with nodes only in
a geographical vicinity, constitutes an ideal setup for an
RGG model [49]. We will consider a two-dimensional
RGG model generated by first placing N nodes ran-
domly within the unit square [0, 1]2. Undirected edges
are placed between two nodes if and only if the Eu-
clidean distance between such nodes is at most d(N),
where d(N) is a positive number that may depend on the
network size N . We will denote such a RGG by GN,d(N).
Like the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi case, our focus will be on under-
standing how the source sets should be chosen to ensure
r-feasibility of GN,d(N) with high probability. To provide
such a characterization, we first recall a few functions
from [48]. Let H(x) , x lnx−x+ 1 be defined on [0,∞)
and J(x) , lnx−1+x−1 be defined on (0,∞). Further-
more, let J−1R : [0,∞) → [1,∞) denote the inverse of
J(x) when the domain of J(x) is [1,∞). We then have
the following result.
Proposition 7 Given an LTI system (1) and a measure-
ment model (2), let the communication graph be modeled
by the RGG GN,d(N), where d(N) =
√
a lnN
piN and a > 1.
For each λj ∈ ΩU (A), let a node be chosen as a source
node for λj with a probability p independently of the other
nodes in the network. Let r = γa lnN , where γ ∈ (0, 15pi ).
Suppose a ≥ 5piH(5piγ) and
p ≥ min
{
γ,
5piγ
J−1R (
1
aγ )
}
. (D.2)
Then, GN,d(N) is r-feasible. 12
Proof. For each λj ∈ ΩU (A), if the source set Sj is
chosen as described above, then it percolates GN,d(N)
w.h.p. if the conditions of the proposition are met [48,
Theorem 4]. The result then follows from Lemma 4.
Remark 11 In an attack-prone wireless sensor net-
work, one might be interested in tolerating f -local adver-
sarial sets where the paramater f scales with the size of
the network. Such a possibility is captured by Proposition
12 A RGG GN,d(N) is connected w.h.p. for d(N) >
√
lnN
piN
.
The choice of a > 1 thus allows one to deal with an asymp-
totically connected GN,d(N).
7, based on which, bγa lnN−13 c-local Byzantine adversar-
ial sets can be accounted for by our proposed algorithm.
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